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Abstract
Efficient and reliable detection of radiological or nuclear threats is a crucial part of
national and international efforts to prevent terrorist activities. Radiation Portal Moni-
tors (RPMs), which are deployed worldwide, are intended to interdict smuggled fissile
material by detecting emissions of neutrons and gamma rays. However, considering
the range and variety of threat sources, vehicular and shielding scenarios, and that only
a small signature is present, it is important that the design of the RPMs allows these
signatures to be accurately differentiated from the environmental background. Using
Monte-Carlo neutron-transport simulations of a model helium-3 detector system we
have conducted a parameter study to identify the optimum combination of detector
shielding and collimation that maximises the sensitivity of RPMs. These structures,
which could be simply and cost-effectively added to existing RPMs, can improve the
detector response by more than a factor of two relative to an unmodified, bare design.
Furthermore, optimisation of the air gap surrounding the helium tubes also improves
detector efficiency.
1. Introduction
In recent years, concerns about the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism
and of other malicious acts involving such materials have been raised at the interna-
tional level [1]. Coordinated steps are being taken among states to minimise the threat,
but over the next few decades there will be an inevitable global expansion in nuclear
technologies and energy. Whilst this will bring significant benefit to society, it will
nonetheless result in increased challenges from a nuclear security perspective. A sig-
nificant number of incidents of trafficking of nuclear materials have been recorded in
the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) [2], including material which can
be used in radiological devices, and conceivably in nuclear weapons. For example,
a 2013 incident reported by the IAEA [3] included details of a group of traffickers
convicted in Moldova for attempting to sell quantities of uranium and plutonium that
had been transported in shielded lead canisters in an attempt to evade detection sys-
tems. Furthermore, evidence recently heard in the UK [4] refers to the significant illicit
∗Corresponding author, mark.gilbert@ccfe.ac.uk
Preprint submitted to Elsevier July 11, 2018
transportation of 210Po through European airports and cities, which led to significant
contamination of many people and locations. Measures to reduce the radiological and
nuclear threat are many-faceted, but an important component includes the ability to
directly detect attempts to illicitly transport radiological or nuclear material. Here we
focus on passive detection systems that have been employed at the front line, Radiation
Portal Monitors (RPMs), which measure the threat response from vehicles as they pass
between two detector panels.
Commercially available RPM designs typically use gamma and/or neutron detec-
tion technologies to scan vehicles, cargo and people. They have been widely de-
ployed around the world at ports, airports and traffic choke points. Neutron detection
systems are, for example, 6Li-based scintillating glass fibers, 10B-based pressurized
gas tubes, or 3He tubes. Similarly, gamma detection systems are based on, for ex-
ample, polyvinyltoluene (PVT) plastic scintillators, sodium iodide NaI(Tl) detectors,
cadmium-zinc-telluride (CZT) or, at greater expense, high-purity germanium (HPGe)
crystals. Here we evaluate neutron detecting RPMs by considering 3He pressurized gas
tubes as the detection technology, which are widely used in neutron detectors. They are
considered to be a particularly attractive choice because of the high response efficiency
to thermal neutrons, due to the high 3He(n,p)3H reaction cross section, and the very
low sensitivity to gamma rays. However, a well known drawback with such systems
is the current (lack of) availability of 3He, which is derived from the radioactive decay
product of 3H. This is largely due to significantly reduced 3H stockpiles and produc-
tion sources, which has been accompanied by increased demand [5], and has driven the
market to consider alternative neutron detection technologies [6, 7, 8]. Nevertheless,
given that most, if not all [9], of the neutron-detection systems currently deployed are
based on 3He pressurized gas tubes we have used it as the basis of this optimisation
study.
Considering the range of radiological or nuclear threat sources, vehicular and shield-
ing scenarios, and that only a small signature is sometimes emitted, it is important that
the design of RPMs allows these signatures to be accurately differentiated from the
residual background response, caused largely by cosmological radiation – without an
unacceptable number of false or missed alarms. The purpose of this paper is to con-
sider, via a computational modelling approach, certain design factors affecting the per-
formance of 3He-based RPMs, including the variation in response to the background
radiation field, and to suggest simple, cost-effective enhancements to optimise the abil-
ity to detect nuclear threats. The aim was to demonstrate that alterations to a generic
RPM model design and surrounding environment can enable a significant reduction in
the measured neutron background, and hence lower their detection limit to a ‘threat’
neutron source.
Previous works [10, 11] have explored the optimisation of 3He-based detector re-
sponse within polythene box-like configurations, as used by Kouzes et al. [12], to fac-
tors such as neutron spectra, levels of shielding, polythene moderation, tube diameter,
and fill pressure. This work, however, uses an alternative generic RPM design, with
performance optimisation for a threat source relative to the neutron background envi-
ronment through shielding and collimation enhancements.
In the following, Monte-Carlo neutron-transport simulations of a model RPM de-
tector system, performed with MCNPX, combined with a variety of ‘roadway’ materi-
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als, are used to evaluate the detection response as a function of location environment.
Subsequently, a detailed parameter optimisation is applied to simple and cost-effective
shielding and collimation modifications to demonstrate that they could be added to ex-
isting RPMs to significantly reduce detection limits to a neutron threat-source in an
environmental neutron field. Optimisation of the generic RPM design, via the intro-
duction of air gaps, is also considered.
2. Setup & Preliminaries
A pair of basic ‘generic’ 3He-based detector panels were developed for this study.
Each RPM panel sits at ground level and consists of an array of 13 one atmosphere 3He
tubes, of length 125 cm and radius 2.52 cm of which 0.1 cm is the stainless steel tank
enclosing the helium. The 3He in the model has a density of 2.5×10−5 atoms per barn-
cm and the surrounding 304LN stainless steel, whose composition is shown in Table 1,
has a density of 7.9 g cm−3. The tubes are completely surrounded by polythene (two-
thirds H atoms, one-third C) with a density of 0.93 g cm−3, although later (section 4 we
consider adaptations to this where there is an air gap between the tubes and polythene.
Each polythene sub-unit block is of dimension 12 cm x 9.04 cm. The detection panels
are 156 cm in length and 135 cm in height. The two panels are spaced by a distance
of 300 cm. The panels are positioned above a ground material volume, which is 100
cm thick, and surrounded by air at a density of 5.41× 10−5 atoms per barn-cm. Fig. 1
shows a schematic and 3D view of the basic design, while Fig. 4 shows more detail,
including some of the modifications discussed in later sections.
2.1. Environmental background neutron sources
The key performance measure in the present work is the relative response of a given
RPM configuration to the defined threat in comparison to the environmental back-
ground. Background neutrons are produced in the atmosphere and upper few meters of
the earth’s crust by interactions between cosmic rays and nuclei. Primary cosmic rays
collide with nuclei in the upper atmosphere and create cascades of secondary particles,
including neutrons and muons, that can penetrate to the Earth’s surface. These high-
energy secondary neutrons interact with the local environment at the Earth’s surface,
generating further neutrons due to spallation events [9]. We have modelled the atmo-
spheric cosmic ray neutron background as a planar source 2.5 m above the ground with
a cos2θ distribution from the zenith direction. Note that interaction of this background
source with the ground material and detector assembly is modelled, and the implica-
tions of varying the ground material is explored below. A hemispherical surface source
with an isotopic directional distribution was also considered, but no significant change
in the results was noted.
The energy spectrum of the background neutrons was derived from EXPACS ver.
2.22 [13]. Input parameters were latitude, 51.0809 and longitude 1.1858 with no envi-
ronmental (ground) parameters. In Fig. 2 the ‘blank’ curve shows the EXPACS spec-
trum implemented.
A background normalisation factor Nbkgrd was calculated for the model using the
asphalt pavement ground material model and by setting a nominal neutron flux of 100
3
Fig. 1. (lhs) Generic 3He-based panel detector model with dimensions (in cm), showing
as side view (top) and view from above (bottom). (rhs) 3-D image of detectors.
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n m2 s−1 [12] in a region at the mid-point between the two detectors in this model.
This normalisation factor Nbkgrd equals 5950 background neutrons per second, and
was applied to all simulations in this study (regardless of the ground material used).
Note that in the present studies there is no consideration of how the background
might suppressed due to physical proximity of a vehicle or other structure.
2.1.1. Background variation with ground material
The relative neutron background response of an RPM is determined by its immedi-
ate environment. In particular, background neutrons will be produced below the RPM
from interactions with high atomic mass nuclei in the ground material or ‘roadway’.
Whilst not the primary consideration in the present work, it is interesting to explore
how background neutron production can be influenced (minimised) by replacing ex-
isting asphalt or concrete based ground surfaces with a material containing reduced
concentrations of high atomic mass aggregate materials and increased hydrogenous
neutron-absorbing material.
For a variety of different ground materials – see table 1 – an MCNPX [14] simula-
tion of 107 particle histories was performed using the environmental source discussed
above, and the (n, p) (neutron absorption followed by proton emission) reaction rate
R was tallied in the 3He tubes. This reaction, which has a high thermal cross section,
produces two charged particles – a proton and a triton – whose ionization can be de-
tected and counted via energy deposition pulses [15]. Note that other reactions on 3He,
such as (n, d) (neutron capture followed by deuteron emission), are negligible in the
present study, with the (n, p) reaction typically contributing more than 99.7% of the
total reaction rate (also tallied). In MCNPX, which is used for all calculations in the
present work, the upper neutron energy was adjusted to 1×105 MeV (EMAX parameter,
phys:N 1E5) with the remaining neutron physics options set as default.
Fig. 2 shows the background neutron spectra, measured in the helium tubes of
the bare, unshielded detectors, for the different ground materials. The spectra were
measured (tallied) in MCNPX using 60 equally-spaced (on a logarithmic scale) energy
grid-points between 1 × 10−3 eV and 1 × 105 MeV. The ‘blank’ in the figure is the
result in the absence of any ground material. In this ‘ideal’ scenario the proportion
of thermal neutrons, which could produce count noise in the detectors, is very low
in the tubes. The best performing ground material – that which keeps the thermal
neutron component lowest – is the 10B-enriched boronated silicone rubber. This is
confirmed by the count rate histogram shown in Fig. 3, where the enriched rubber
produces the lowest background counts per second Cbkgrd, calculated by multiplying
the background normalisation Nbkgrd (background source neutrons per second) by the
MCNPX-calculated (n, p) reaction rate Rbkgrd (reactions cm−3 per source neutron)
and the total volume of 3He tubing VHe (= 2296.12 cm3):
Cbkgrd = NbkgrdRbkgrdVHe. (1)
However, as shown in Fig. 3, standard asphalt or Portland concrete roadways per-
form reasonably, certainly compared to steel, and so it is likely that there would not
be a great cost benefit to replacing these ‘standard’ roadway materials. This would be
especially true if it is desirable for the RPM to be mobile – far better to improve the
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Table 1. The compositions and densities of the different ground materials considered.
Material Density Composition (weight %)
Asphalt Pavement 2.5784 45.91% O, 23.14% Si, 8.45% Ca, 7.62% C,
5.10% Al + 9.78% remainder of Fe, Mg, K,
Na, H, Ti, S, Pb, N, Mn, V, and Ni
304LN Stainless Steel 7.9 70.17% Fe, 17.23% Cr, 10.5% Ni + 2.12%
remainder of Mn, C, N, Si, P, Ti, Cu, Ni,
and Mo
Portland concrete 2.3 52.9% O, 33.7% Si, 4.4% Ca, 3.4% Al, +
5.6% remainder of Na, Fe, H, K, Mg, and
C
Boronated silicone rubber (BISCO) 1.119 47.71% C, 31.19% O, 7.87% H, 4.94% Na,
4.55% natural B, 3.56% N, and 0.18% Si
Boronated silicone rubber (BISCO) – 1.119 as above but with 10B instead of natural B
enriched to 100% 10B
Water 1.0 11.17% H, 88.83% O
Sea Water 1.023343 11.17% H, 88.83% O, 1.94% Cl, 1.08% Na
+ 0.31% remainder of Mg, S, Ca, K, and F
shielding of the detector itself to background noise. This is explored further below,
with asphalt assumed for the ground material hence forth.
3. RPM design optimisation
The above analysis illustrates how sensitive the response of a RPM system can be
to the local environment, which can also include the other structures that make up a
detector panel.
The approach taken in the following was to consider making simple and cost-
effective changes (additions) to the bare, generic RPM design introduced earlier and
assess how the particular geometrical parameters of these modifications might influ-
ence the response of the detector to both a threat source and background neutron field.
In particular, the relative change in response to the two different neutron sources is
significant – if a modification dramatically reduces both counts, then the sensitivity of
the RPM to a threat may not be improved. Only in situations where the background
count is reduced to a relatively greater extent than the threat count are the detection lim-
its and sensitivity improved. The particular relationships between the two responses,
which necessitates at least two MCNPX simulations for each configuration, will be
discussed later.
Several different options for modifications are possible, but for the present study we
consider block shielding of varying thickness around the sides and back of the detector.
This is combined with a similar shielding block on the front face (facing the ‘threat’)
with holes of varying depths and shape, thereby creating a collimation effect, which
favours the detection of neutrons approaching from near-perpendicular directions (i.e.
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Fig. 2. Comparison of background neutron spectra experienced in the 3He tubes with
different ground materials (planar background source). The flux units for each neu-
tron energy are the raw output from MCNPX, which in this case is per environmental
neutron nenviro.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of detector responses to the environmental neutron background for
different ground material types.
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from the threat). The base design, with a default 5 cm thick shield and collimator layer
of boronated polythene (10% by mass of boron with a density of 1.0 g cm−3 [16]), is
illustrated in Fig. 4, which is a graphical realisation of the MCNPX model used in the
study.
As a first step, the response of a 5 cm thick shielded configuration, with and with-
out a similar 5 cm front-face collimator, was tested against the original bare generic
detector design. For this case the collimator holes are cylindrical with diameter 4.6 cm
spaced approximately 5.2 cm apart (centre-to-centre). MCNPX simulations were per-
formed, firstly to obtain the statistical response of the configuration to the background
source, and then secondly, to predict the response of the detector to a 252Cf neutron
point ‘threat’ source with an emission rate of 2000 n/s moving at a typical vehicle ve-
locity of 2 m s−1 (rounded to 1 sig. fig. from that reported in [17]) along the mid-line
between the two detectors. In the latter case a series of runs were performed with the
threat in various discrete locations along the trajectory, the results from which were
then integrated in time assuming a 2 s acquisition time. Previous works [18, 19] have
considered the impact of varying the vehicle velocity and integration time, but this is
beyond the scope of the present work. In all runs 107 particles histories were calcu-
lated, which resulted in reaction rates with statistical errors of less than 3%. Note that
the symmetry of the problem was utilised so that for a threat moving between ±2 m
relative to the half-way point along the length of the detectors in the 2 s, only 1 s
of the acquisition in the positive measurement positions needs to be considered with
post-multiplication by 2 to obtain the total response.
Fig. 5 depicts the results from this initial ‘test’ simulation. In Fig. 5a, the response
of the three configurations at each of the discrete positions is shown in units of counts
per second, calculated via:
C = φsrcRsrcVHe, (2)
where φsrc is the threat source emission strength in n/s, Rsrc is the (n, p) reaction
rate measured by MCNPX in the helium tubes (reactions per cm3 per neutron). As
expected, the RPM response decreases as the position increases, as the source gets fur-
ther away from the detector. The figure further shows that the shielded configuration
increases the count rate compared to the original detector, which is due to increased
back-scatter and moderation of the source neutrons. With collimation, on the other
hand, the count response is dramatically reduced, suggesting that many of the neutrons
are prevented from reaching the detector tubes by the boronated polythene in the col-
limator. However, this is not necessarily an indicator of a poor RPM design because,
as stated previously, it is the relative change in response compared to the change in
response to the background that determines detector efficiency.
Fig. 5b considers this relative response by comparing the cumulative response of
each RPM design over the 2 s acquisition of a threat moving uniformly between -2 m
to +2 m to an alarm-level A set using the Currie limit:
A = Ctotalbkgrd + 4.65σbkgrd, (3)
where σbkgrd is the standard deviation of the total background count Ctotalbkgrd in 2s,
which is defined by multiplying the left-hand side of Eq. (1) by t = 2 s.
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Fig. 5. Source responses for the unshielded RPM, and the default, 5 cm thick shielded
and shield+collimator configurations. The assumed ground material was asphalt. In
(a) the absolute response in counts/s of the system as a function of position of the 2000
n/s 252Cf source relative to the half-way point along the length of the detector (posi-
tion=0), and (b) the cumulative response over the 2 s acquisition time from -200 cm to
+200 cm. The horizontal lines in (b) in the same colour as the cumulative fill show the
associated alarm level for each of the cases, which is defined by the relative response
to the background.
From the figure, we can clearly see that, for these set of three default designs with
a threat strength of 2000 n/s, the unshielded design would not detect the threat, while
the shielded designs, with and without collimation would, despite the fact that one has
a higher and one a much lower threat response compared to the bare design. This
confirms that a sensitive trade-off exists between: 1) achieving a low detector response
to the environmental neutron field and 2) minimising the loss of response to a ‘threat’
source. The following parameter studies investigate this trade-off in more detail.
3.1. Parameter study
The above confirms that the addition of shielding and collimator can improve de-
tector performance, but to find an optimum configuration a parameter study is needed.
In the following, shielding and collimator thickness, as well as collimator hole (‘pack-
ing’) density and profile have been varied and the resulting detector response compared
against an overall system performance function, ‘minimum source to alarm’ (or ‘mini-
mum source alarmed’ – see below).
3.1.1. Performance measure: ‘minimum source to alarm’
In a parameter study, a relatively large number of separate responses must be
assessed – one for each parameter set – which makes a detailed, counts-vs-time or
response-with-position analysis impractical. Thus, for this extended study we have
used a single performance measure that can be used to compare different detector con-
figurations.
Firstly, rather than considering the variation in response with the source position
(as in Fig. 5a) we only measure the overall response to a line source representing all
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possible source positions during the 2s acquisition time. Not only does this reduce
the number and complexity of the required Monte-Carlo simulations, but it also means
that the threat source response for a given configuration is a well-defined function of
a single quantity extracted directly from the MCNPX simulations. The total source
counts per acquisition Ctotal, is given by:
Ctotal = φsrcRsrctVHe, (4)
where t is the total acquisition time (2s).
A second Monte-Carlo simulation gives the response of the detector to the planar
background, again as an (n, p) reaction rate Rbkgrd, which is used to define the alarm-
level A via the Currie [20] detection limit defined earlier (see Eq. (3)).
To define the relative effectiveness of a particular detector configuration, we then
define the ‘minimum source to alarm’ as the lowest theoretically detectable threat
strength φminsrc by equating Ctotal = A, using the square root of Ctotalbkgrd for σbkgrd,
and rearranging. For comparison, note that the values of this performance measure for
the configurations considered in the preliminary calculations in the previous section
are 2638 n/s for the bare, unshielded system, 1647 n/s for the system with 5 cm of
boronated polythene behind and at the sides of the detector (which remains fixed for
the parameter study in this section), and 1286 n/s for the shielded detector with the 5
cm thick collimator made of boronated polythene.
3.1.2. Variable parameters
Schematics of the detector geometry used for this optimisation study are shown in
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7. Note that here we have taken advantage of further problem symme-
try and have only modelled a single detector, locating a reflecting plane on the other
side of the source line distribution (see previous section). This simplification not only
makes the input file for the MCNP model easier to manipulate and adjust for differ-
ent parameter sets, but it also reduces computational time, which, as already noted, is
crucial when a large number of simulations are required.
In Fig. 6 the basic detector design is shown and two of the variable parameters are
labelled. The first of these is the collimator depth δ, which varies from 0.1 to 40 cm.
Additionally, an extra layer of solid forward shielding, with thickness κ, has been added
between the detector tubes and collimator, which may improve neutron moderation and
detection. κ is allowed to range from 0 to 10 cm. Note that the material used for this
extra shielding is the same basic polythene (see section 2) that surrounds the helium
tubes, and is not the boronated polythene used for the collimator and other shielding.
Two other parameters were varied. The first of these, illustrated by Fig. 7, is the
profile of the holes in the collimator. By default these are simple cylindrical holes,
which could be easily drilled into a sheet of the boronated polythene used to construct
the collimator. For the parameter study, the cross sectional profile of the holes was
varied using the ratio ir/or, where ir and or are the inner (middle) and outer radii of
the hole, respectively. This allowed the profile to vary from cylindrical (ir/or = 1),
to progressively more conical profiles (as illustrated in the figure), where ir/or is less
than one.
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showing variable parameters δ (collimator depth) and κ (front shielding thickness). In
this picture the threat neutrons come from above.
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Fig. 7. Top view slice of the detector showing optimisation parameters for collimator
profile.
The final parameter was the packing density of the collimator holes, varied by
changing or, and measured as the percentage open area on the front face of collimator.
3.2. Optimisation Results
In the present we began by optimising the additional forward shielding thickness κ,
in conjunction with collimator depth δ. From Fig. 8, which shows how the minimum
detectable threat φminsrc varies with δ for various choices of κ, we see that there is an
optimum at 1-2 cm for this extra shielding, under the assumption that the collimator
depth is close to optimum. Note that, for very thick collimators, sufficient attenuation
is achieved without the need for extra shielding, and so κ = 0 is optimal (red curve
with circles in figure). However, very large δ are not likely as these do not produce
good overall detector performance.
With κ = 1 or 2 cm the results demonstrate that a collimator thickness of 5 cm is
optimal producing a minimum alarmed source of approximately 1.2 × 103 n/s, with
κ = 2 cm marginally better at this collimator depth. For this reason κ = 2 cm was
selected as the fixed forward shielding thickness in the remainder of this parameter
study, where δ, or and ir are allowed to vary. This leads to a total of 4 cm of polythene
between the edge of the stainless steel tanks enclosing the helium and the start of the
collimator, which is an important number to note for the analysis later of the optimum
base detector design (section 4).
Fig. 9 shows the variation in minimum alarmed source φminsrc as a function of the
ratio or/ir for different values of δ, demonstrating that, almost without exception,
keeping the holes in the collimator cylindrical (or/ir = 1) is the best option. Note here
13
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Fig. 9. Variation in detector response as a function of the ratio of the inner or middle
radius of the collimator holes to the outer radius. Curves are shown for different values
of the collimator depth parameter δ.
that we are only considering a small subset of the collimator depths evaluated earlier
because, as Fig. 8 showed, the best detector performances are obtained when δ is less
than around 10 cm.
For the very thinnest collimator configurations (δ < 2.5 cm), there may be a very
small benefit to having a more conical profile to the holes, but the minimum alarmed
source remains ∼ 1.2 × 103 n/s in all cases. Since thin collimators have relatively
little polythene to help with the attenuation of the neutrons, it is not surprising that any
measure which increases the amount of material, such as tapering the holes (ir < or,
could produce improved detector performance. However, a thicker collimator, such as
the default 5 cm (red curve with circles in the figure), can produce similar performance
with cylindrical holes, so it will be the cost-benefit balance that determines the best
overall preference – i.e. is less boronated polythene with a complex lattice of gaps
cheaper to make than using more polythene with simple drilled holes?
The final optimisation parameter considered was the packing density of the holes
in the collimator themselves. Fig. 10 shows the detector performance results as a func-
tion of the percentage of the front surface of the collimator (facing the threat) occupied
by the holes, which, in the MCNP model, is controlled by varying or. In this case,
the value of ir is kept equivalent to or, to maintain the optimum cylindrical hole pro-
file identified above. For all curves in the figure, which represent different collimator
depths, the lowest achievable alarmed source is once again 1.2 × 103 n/s, which has
been remarkably consistent throughout the parameter study. This possibly indicates
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that this is the lowest achievable result for the current choice of detector design – i.e. a
fixed number of helium tubes with constant spacing – and threat type.
Fig. 10 shows that having large cylindrical holes, producing around a 70-80% total
open surface area (the default design considered previously with or = 4.6 cm had
71% packing), is the optimum configuration, except for very thin collimators (the
δ = 2.5 cm results in the figure) where increasing the amount of moderating mate-
rial through smaller holes can improve matters. While the improvement is only small
for this thin collimator configuration, having smaller holes in the thicker collimator
designs is significantly undesirable.
3.3. Optimisation summary
In summary, for the parameter study, an extra 2 cm thick polythene shield in front of
the basic detector design improved the performance of the RPM, and that additionally a
collimator of depth 5 cm with cylindrical holes occupying about 70-80% of the exposed
surface leads to a minimum source to alarm of 1.2 × 103 n/s. Below, we consider if
this consistent ‘minimum’ can be improved by changing the configuration of the base
helium-tube panels themselves.
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4. Base He-3 detector optimisation
It is known that an ‘albedo cavity’ [10] increases the efficiency of a moderated 3He
detector system by promoting additional scattering and reflection of neutrons in the
vicinity of the gas tubes. To optimise this effect a study has been carried out on an air
gap and moderator configuration for a single detector unit to identify the parameters
that produce the greatest gain in signal response relative to the baseline model used
above, which contained no air cavity. No background shielding or ground materials
were modelled in the following.
Two distinct detector geometries have been investigated:
• The detector volume surrounded by an air cavity consisting of a uniform cylin-
drical shell, see Fig. 11.
• The detector volume encompassed by a rectangular cuboid air cavity, which is
uniform around the detector volume, see Fig. 12.
Air cavity optimisation simulations were carried out such that only a single detector
element was modelled with reflecting boundaries, fixed at 6 cm either side of the centre
of the detector. This allows for the simplified simulation of a bank of detectors with
each detector element having a fixed width of 12 cm.
The mcnp pstudy software tool [21] was used to automate the optimisation of the
shielding and cavity design study using MCNPX [14]. The tool was used to create
input decks by varying the geometric parameters defining the cavity size (width), the
depth α of front polythene shielding between source and detector and the depth β of
rear polythene shielding on the far side of the detector relative to the source. For the
cylindrical shell cavity the cavity width γ (see Fig. 11) ranged from 0 to 3.5 cm, while
for the rectangular gap geometry the total width Γ ranged from 5.04 cm (the diameter
of the helium tubes) to 12 cm. Note that the cavity always extends from the base of the
cylindrical detector to its top. For the cylindrical cavity set-up the front α and rear β
shielding depths, both measured relative to the centre of the detector, ranged from 2.52
(helium tube radius) to 10 cm. For the rectangular set-up the minimum of these two
parameters was the same, but the maximum was increased to 14 cm.
The 252Cf source was used here again, this time distributed uniformly along a line
from -10 cm to 10 cm parallel to the face of the detector, i.e. extending beyond the
reflecting geometry. The source was biased to preferentially produce neutrons in the
direction of the detector. The source to detector distance for the current optimisation
was fixed at 100 cm and positioned 50 cm above ground level, relative to the ∼1.2 m
high detector.
4.1. Results
The measure used to gauge the optimal detector response for this optimisation was
the raw 3He(n, p)3H reaction rate (RR) tallied in the detector volume by MCNP. The
MCNP track length estimate of flux (F4 tally) was multiplied by the total (n, p) cross
section of 3He, thus resulting in a RR in arbitrary units. This response was scored in the
detector volume for each parameter combination. Almost 600 simulations were con-
ducted in total, each running 106 particle histories, which resulted in better than 1%
17
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Fig. 11. (a) Vertical (parallel to detector face) and (b) horizontal cross sections through
the MCNP geometry, showing a simulated cylindrical shell air cavity between the he-
lium tube (green) and polythene shielding (grey).
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Fig. 12. (a) Vertical (parallel to detector face) and (b) horizontal cross sections through
the MCNP geometry, showing a simulated rectangular cuboid air cavity containing the
helium tube (green) and surrounded by polythene shielding (grey).
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Fig. 13. Reaction rates measured in the helium tube detector as a function of the three
design optimisation parameters for a detector surrounded by a cylindrical air cavity.
The optimum result is highlighted with a blue circle.
statistical uncertainty in almost every case. Any test cases with parameter combina-
tions which resulted in overlapping geometry between the air cavity and the polythene
shielding, which resulted in either high statistical errors (> 20%) or fatal errors in the
MCNP simulation, were rejected and given a RR of zero in the following graphical
figures and discussion.
Fig. 13 shows the important results for the cylindrical air gap set-up – the thin
shielding results are omitted because these are either rejects (zero RR), or low RR
compared to the thicker shield options. The figure shows in four separate plots the
results for rear shielding depths β of 4,6,8, and 10 cm, and in each plot there is a curve
of RR versus cavity width γ for these same four thicknesses of front shielding α. From
the results it is readily observable that the optimal cylindrical shell cavity, that with the
highest RR, has an air gap of around 2 cm with 8 cm polythene front shielding and
10 cm polythene rear shielding. This best RR from the study is highlighted with a blue
circle in the figure, and corresponds to a RR of 3.61 × 10−6 (rel. err. 0.6%). For ref-
erence, the baseline model used in the optimisation study discussed earlier (section 3),
over which improvement is sought, having no air cavity and uniform 6 cm by 6 cm
polyethylene shielding, resulted in a RR of 2.95× 10−6 (rel. err. 0.7%). Thus the in-
clusion of a cylindrical shell air cavity and additional shielding resulted in an increase
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Fig. 14. Reaction rates measured in the helium tube detector as a function of the three
design optimisation parameters for a detector surrounded by a rectangular cuboid air
cavity. The optimum result is highlighted with a blue circle.
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in reaction rate by a factor of 1.22.
In Fig. 13, observe also that when the cavity width γ is zero, then, regardless of the
thickness of rear-shielding β, the optimum α thickness is not 8 cm, but rather 6 cm.
This corresponds to a total polythene thickness of around 3.5 cm between the edge
of the steel tank containing the helium and the front face of the detector. This is in
good agreement with the result from the main optimisation study (see the discussion in
section 3.2), where a 4 cm optimum was marginally better than 3 cm (corresponding
to κ sizes of 2 and 1 cm, respectively). Now with a 2 cm air gap around the tubes, the
optimumα has increased to 8 cm, maintaining the same 3.5 cm total forward polythene
depth. why...?
For the rectangular cuboid cavity simulations also showed an increase in RR over
the baseline model, but not as significant as that for the cylindrical shell case. The
sequence of plots in Fig. 14 shows a subset of the results, where again the thinnest
shield configuration options have been omitted. The highlighted optimal geometry in
this case has a 6 cm air cavity, 8 cm polythene front shielding and 14 cm polythene
rear shielding, resulting in a RR of 3.23× 10−6 (rel. err. of 0.7%) – still a factor of 1.1
over the baseline case.
It is interesting to note that the cross sectional area of the air gap is very similar
between the two geometries at 43.7 cm2 and 52.1 cm2, respectively, for the cylindrical
and rectangular configurations (compare this with a maximum cross sectional area of
124 cm2 in the rectangular case). This suggests that there is an optimum volume of
air to have around a helium tube of a given size. Similarly, identical optimal front
polythene shield depths α of 8 cm are observed, although the shape and thickness of
this shielding differs between the models. As noted in the main optimisation study,
this forward shielding will strongly influence, through moderation and absorption, the
number and energy of the neutrons reaching the detector, so it is not surprising that the
values are the same.
Notice also, that for both air gap configurations, the optimum response is obtained
with the maximum (of the parameter range considered) rear-shielding thickness. In
principle, the response could be improved even more by increasing the rear-shielding
further, thereby increasing neutron back-scattering, but at some point there will be a
trade-off between marginal response improvement and the cost of more shielding. We
return to this point later, during optimisation of the rear-shielding for the full detector
system (section 5).
The spectra recorded in the detector volume, for each of the two optimal models,
together with that of the baseline model, are shown in Fig. 15. All three spectra show
similar shape profiles, although the thermal flux peak at around 0.07 eV is higher than
the baseline for the rectangular optimal case, and higher still with an optimal cylindri-
cal air cavity. The 3He detector has a 1/v response and so it is precisely this higher
thermal component in the optimal spectra that produces the greater RR compared to the
baseline. It is clear from the results that the optimising finds the right balance between
thermalizing the fission spectra and retaining a high neutron flux to maximise detector
response. The optimal cylindrical shell air gap configuration has the highest thermal
energy neutron flux per source neutron and thus, with contribution from the rest of the
spectra, has the highest reaction rate.
As a final point, note that at for the high-energy peak in the spectra shown in Fig. 15,
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Fig. 15. Flux spectra recorded in the detector volume for the baseline and optimal
detector configurations.
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κ
δ
λ
Fig. 16. Top view of detector showing additional optimisation parameter λ, which
allows for extra polythene shielding behind the helium tubes. Note that in this new
improved model the gap between the regions controlled by κ and λ and the edge of the
air gap surrounding the helium tanks is only 0.02 cm (previously in section 3 it was 2
cm when there was no air gap).
the optimal cylindrical configuration actually has a higher flux than the optimal rect-
angular case. This suggests that there is still room for improvement because a further
lowering of this peak could increase the thermal peak. The use of other moderator ma-
terials, particularly inelastic scatters, to improve the spectrum shaping is undoubtedly
an approach worth pursuing but is beyond the scope of this work.
5. RPM design optimisation revisited
Using the optimised cylindrical air cavity thickness of ∼2 cm (in fact 1.98 cm for
an overall tube radius of 4.5 cm), into which the standard 2.52 cm radius 3He tubes
are positioned, further optimisation of the full detector system has been carried out.
As before, we use the ‘minimum source to alarm’ φminsrc measure to judge the relative
effectiveness of different designs. The thicknesses of the base polythene in front and
behind the detector are considered as part of this optimisation process (the κ parameter
discussed in section 3.1.2 already accounts for the front shielding).
Fig. 16 shows the new design for optimisation, including the new variable λ that
controls the amount of extra polythene shielding between the helium tube units and
the start of the rear boronated polythene shielding. As before (section 3.1.2), κ varies
between 0 and 10 cm in the study, while λ can be up to 80 cm.
5.1. Results
As in the original multi-parameter study of shielding and collimation parameters
(section 3), we considered the optimisation of the shielding thicknesses first, before
allowing the other parameters to vary. Fig. 17 shows a typical result from these sim-
ulations, in this case for a collimator depth of 5 cm. It is immediately apparent that
the best ‘minimum source alarmed’ has fallen from the 1200 n/s observed in the initial
parameter study, to around 1000 n/s with the newly optimised helium tube unit cell
and air gap – representing around a 15 % improvement in optimum performance. In
agreement with the detector unit optimisation, the corresponding factor improvement
(old/new) is 1.2.
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Fig. 17. Typical result from the revisited parameter study with a ∼2 cm air cavity
around the helium tubes. The variation in ‘minimum source to alarm’ φminsrc is shown
as a function of the solid shielding depths (κ and λ) for a fixed collimator depth δ of
5 cm.
Fig. 17 also demonstrates that, in general, the thicker the rear shielding the better
– a result that is reproduced regardless of the collimator thickness δ. However, above
about λ = 15 or 20 cm, there is only marginal improvement in detector performance,
and so, as was noted for in the air gap optimisation (section 4), there is likely to be
a trade-off with sensitivity versus cost of more polythene. In the remainder of the
revisited study we take λ = 40 cm as a mid-range thickness that gives almost optimum
sensitivity.
In contrast to the previous parameter study, where κ = 2 was optimum, for the new
geometry we find that it is an extra shielding thickness κ of 5 cm that produces the best
detector performance. This reflects the fact that previously, where there was no air gap,
there was already 2 cm of polythene between the helium tanks and the collimator before
adding extra shielding through κ. Now, with the 4.5 cm radius tube of air surrounding
the tanks, the default shielding is virtually zero. Thus, it is not surprising that κ = 5
becomes optimum, and it is possible that κ = 4 might be slightly better still, although
the 1000 n/s best value of φminsrc is unlikely to change.
Using these optimised values of κ = 5 cm and λ = 40 cm, produces the simulation
results shown in Fig. 18 for a new parameter study of the collimator profile. As before,
there is no real benefit to making the holes more conical (ratio less than one in the
figure), even when the collimator thickness is small. Once again, δ = 5 cm produces
the best detector sensitivity, in agreement with the original parameter study.
Finally, we vary the hole packing-density, producing the results in Fig. 19, for the
optimised values of κ and λ. The best minimum remains around 1000 n/s, but there
is a slight benefit for some of the thicker collimators to having wider holes (greater %
open in the plot).
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Fig. 18. Typical result from the revisited parameter study with a ∼2 cm air cavity
around the helium tubes. The variation in ‘minimum source to alarm’ φminsrc is shown
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Fig. 19. Typical result from the revisited parameter study with a ∼2 cm air cavity
around the helium tubes. The variation in ‘minimum source to alarm’ φminsrc is shown
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6. Summary and Discussion
This paper describes a sequence of parameters design studies to optimise the perfor-
mance of a 3He-based radiation portal monitor (RPM). The sequence of studies, from
a preliminary analysis of the impact of the ground material under the RPM, through
to detailed optimisations of the various shielding, collimator, and detector-design op-
tions, have built upon one-another and revealed via computational modelling that sim-
ple, cost-effective alterations to RPM design could produce significant improvements
in sensitivity to threats present in a background neutron field.
An optimisation study of basic shielding and collimator options demonstrated a
significantly improvement in the response of a generic RPM design to a moving ‘threat’
source in a realistic neutron background field. The parameter study revealed that 2 cm
of extra polythene in front of the detector (with a 5 cm thick rear shield) improved
performance, which, when combined with a 5 cm thick collimator with cylindrical
holes occupying around 70% of the exposed surface, could produce more than a factor
of two improved sensitivity compared to an original, unmodified RPM. The optimised,
modified RPM showed ∼1200 n/s minimum threat detected performance compared to
∼2600 n/s for the unmodified RPM.
An additional optimisation of the geometry immediately surrounding the 3He tubes
themselves indicated that the inclusion of an air gap, approximately 2 cm thick around
the 3He tubes improved the response (compared to no air) of the detector to the threat
source. This knowledge was used to further optimise the shielding and collimation
design, and resulted in a further 15% reduction in the ‘minimum source alarmed’ φminsrc
performance measure (compared to the optimised configuration with no air around
the 3He tanks). In particular, including thick shielding of 20 cm or more behind the
detector reduced the response to the background while improving back-scattering of
neutrons from the threat source. Combined with a 5 cm thick layer of forward shielding
and the same 5 cm thick collimator with a exposed surface about 70% occupied by
cylindrical holes, the sensitivity was improved sufficiently to detect a source strength
of only 1000 n/s – a factor of ∼2.6 improvement over the unmodified ‘bare’ RPM.
During the optimisation studies it became apparent that a fully-fledged fitting pro-
gram could be more efficient at identifying optimum configuration, and would allow
all parameters to vary at the same time. A computer program, which would minimise
the ‘minimum source alarmed’ objective function by varying the parameter set used
to construct the MCNP model would greatly benefit these kinds of studies in the fu-
ture. Such a development would reveal a more precise ‘best parameter set’ than those
obtained here, and could be targeted at a specific RPM design instead of the generic
model considered. Additionally, the current studies were restricted to 3He detectors
and an unshielded 252Cf neutron source threat. Further studies should investigate the
variation in optimum parameters for both different detectors, such as 6Li-based scintil-
lators or other non-3He based technologies (see [6] for a discussion of the options), and
different threat types, including shielded sources and different spectral sources such as
241Am-Be, 241Am-Li, fissile metals and oxides for example. In addition, sensitivity of
optimum configurations to changing background level, including suppression caused
by the passage of large vehicles [22, 19], exotic shield/collimation materials, and alter-
native geometries would be of interest to demonstrate robustness of design.
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Finally, the results presented here need to be complemented by experiment, both to
confirm the adequacy of the modelling and to prototype the proposed RPM improve-
ments. However, this does not detract from the obvious potential of the modelling
approach, which can offer both insight into the factors controlling the efficiency of a
RPMs, and suggest practical design changes to improve performance.
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